U srpnju 2020. ljubljanski IFIMES objavio je jednu od niza dezinformacijskih i netočnih analiza u vezi s izborima u Hrvatskoj (ifimes.org: Parlamentarni izbori u Hrvatskoj 2020: Hrvatska u još većem raskoraku između prošlosti i budućnosti). Tu smo „analizu“ podrobno analizirali (https://zagrebsecurityforum.com/analysis/id/3094) i pokazali da vrvi netočnostima, neistinama i predrasudama koje se od organizacije koja se predstavlja kao znanstvena i stručna ne bi smjelo događati. U međuvremenu ta je organizacija objavila još nekoliko uradaka koji su netočni, neobjektivni, tendenciozni te maliciozni s obzirom na ciljeve koje žele postići.

Posljednja u nizu njihovih kvazi znanstvenih „analiza“ objavljena je 21.7.2022. na temu namjeravanih promjena izbornog zakona BiH i njihovo usklađivanje s presudama međunarodnih¹ i sudova BiH. Ova „analiza“ IFIMES-a, kao i druge kojima su oni navodni autori, počinje s napomenom da se iz „opsežne analize“ (ili bolje rečeno parapolitičkih podvala) izdvajaju samo najvažniji i najzanimljiviji dijelovi. Nismo primijetili da su te analize objavljene u njihovom punom sadržaju.

Ni ova „analiza“ kao ni njihovi slični uradci nisu potpisani. Što je i razumljivo jer bi se ozbiljni znanstvenici uistinu sramili potpisati pod ovakav pamflet pun dezinformacija. Zbog toga, a kako bi izbjegli moguće nesporazume, na samom početku želimo definirati pojam dezinformacije kako bi lakše objasnili i dokazali zašto su brojne izjave napisane u „analizi“ IFIMES-a u stvari dezinformacije: 

Svjesno iskrivljena, nepotpuna te djelomično ili potpuno netočna obavijest, koje je naručitelj i stvarni autor prikriven, kojoj je cilj da CP, utjecajem na kognitivnoj razini, navede na donošenje odluka koje im nanose štetu, odnosno kratkoročno i/ili dugoročno mijenja njihov KJZ².    

Također je potrebno ponoviti teoreme o dezinformacijama kako bi se lakše razumjelo ciljeve koje dezinformatori ovakvim uracima žele postići:

1. teorem: Ako javnost (korisnik) prima dezinformaciju kao istinitu, onda je dezinformacija istinita po svojim posljedicama.

2. teorem: Ako javnost (korisnik) prima objektivnu informaciju kao neistinitu, onda je objektivna informacija neistinita (lažna) po svojim posljedicama³. 

Iz navedenog proizlazi potreba da se dezinformacije moraju javno prikazati kao takve, identificirati njihovi autori te skrivene namjere jer se jedino na takav način moderna društva i države mogu učinkovito boriti protiv njih sprječavajući njihov mogući negativan utjecaj. Stoga ćemo, pazeći da ne mijenjamo kontekst napisanog sadržaja te da ne manipuliramo rečenicama, izdvojiti nekoliko ključnih dezinformacijskih poruka, ukazati na njihove kratkoročne i dugoročne namjere te identificirati stvarne naručitelje ovih dezinformacija.

1. „Više od decenije američka administracija je Bosnu i Hercegovinu prepustila u brigu EU, koja je više nego očito propustila historijsku priliku da napravi važne iskorake ka prosperitetnoj BiH. Ne samo da se to nije desilo nego je EU danas u BiH napravila identičnu situaciju kao u Ukrajini pred invaziju Rusije. Dosadašnji slijed poteza zvaničnika EU prema BiH također upućuje na prisutnost visokih korupcijskih rizika kao i u slučaju eventualnog nametanja Izbornog zakona BiH. “.

Neistina je da je BiH prepuštena EU te da administracija SAD ništa ne pokušava napraviti kako bi riješila brojne i duboke probleme koji opterećuju budućnost BiH a izravno su povezani sa zloporabom izbornog procesa od strane stranaka bh Bošnjaka⁴ koji se vode Velikobošnjačkom unitarističkom politikom. Sjetimo se samo brojnih aktivnosti i rješenja koja je Gabriel Escobar⁵ pokušavao dogovoriti u BiH, ali je uvijek naišao na zid nerazumijevanja, ignoriranja i odbijanja kod Velikobošnjačkih političara. On je i dan danas aktivan u pronalaženju rješenja tih ozbiljnih problema. S druge strane rječnik kojim se u ovoj analizi optužuje EU, čak i za Rusku agresiju na Ukrajinu, prelazi svaku granicu realnog i objektivnog sagledavanja procesa. Namjera autora je potpuno ignoriranje napora EU, koji su u skladu s temeljnim vrijednostima na kojima počiva EU. Stoga se već u prvoj rečenici ove „analize“ treba postaviti pitanje: jesu li autori osobe koje uistinu žele da BiH postane dio EU ili im je izjava da žele da BiH postane dio EU tek eufemizam za stvaranje teokratskog društva, bošnjačke nacionalne države? S druge strane, potrebno je povući neke paralele sa sudjelovanjem SAD u zaustavljanju rata u Hrvatskoj i BiH. I tadašnje djelovanje SAD prema (u ovom slučaju) bh Bošnjacima temeljilo se na želji administracije SAD da pokažu islamskom svijetu da politika SAD nije protuislamska jer, bez obzira što Izetbegović i bh Bošnjaci naprave, SAD će ih zaštiti (CIA: Bosnia Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency). Čak su i tadašnji predstavnici međunarodne zajednice koji su pregovarali s Izetbegovićem znali za njegovu sklonost ka prevrtljivosti i mijenjanju mišljenja⁶. 

Autori ne shvaćaju temeljni sustav načela, vrijednosti i uvjerenja na kojima počiva EU: sukobe treba de-eskalirati i rješavati uporabom i snagom argumenata u diplomatskim procesima koji nikad nisu dovoljno dugi dokle god priječe eskaliranje krize i prerastanje u nemire, ulično nasilje, sukobe i ratove. Ako to autori, koji navodno žive u EU ne shvaćaju, ili pak ne žele shvatiti, ako se u svom radu drže načela da je argument snage važniji od snage argumenta, onda takvim „stručnjacima“, „političarima“ nije mjesto u zajednici različitih naroda koji svoje razlike rješavaju razgovorima, a ne prevarama i nasiljem.

2. Daytonski mirovni sporazum ne može sam po sebi donijeti ozbiljne promjene, jer njegova etnička osnova štiti (doslovno) stare političke elite, predvođene gospodarima rata koji su postali vječiti političari. Sve je svedeno na etnicitet, Bošnjaci, Srbi i Hrvati uz snažnu prisutnost kriminala i korupcije. U ovoj formuli nema mjesta za mlade i napredne ljude. U Bosni i Hercegovini ukoliko se ostvare najave o nametanju Izbornog zakona od strane OHR-a na sceni ćemo imati libanonizaciju izbornog zakona. Umjesto sunita, šiita i kršćana kao u libanonskom slučaju, u BiH imamo trajno zacementirane Bošnjake, Srbe i Hrvate.

Opet dio koji vrvi neistinama. Istina je upravo potpuno drugačija. Daytonski mirovni sporazumi, do kojih se došlo zahvaljujući snažnom angažiranju Hrvatske i njenih oružanih, obavještajnih i diplomatskih efektiva u pobjedi na oružanima snagama Srba, na diplomatskom, informacijskom, te kad je to bilo nužno i na bojnom polju, naravno uz pomoć saveznika, bh Bošnjaci bi bili svedeni na manje od ¼ teritorija BiH. Takvu su im sudbinu namijenili Srbi u BiH koje je vodila stranka SDS, čiji je predsjednik i vođa bio Radovan Karadžić. Armija BiH nije mogla izvesti niti jednu oslobodilačku operaciju. Upravo u tome leži sva apsurdnost ovih optužbi na račun međunarodne zajednice posebno na račun EU. Već nekoliko godina jasno je vidljiva snažna suradnja velikobošnjačke stranke SDA sa srpskom strankom SDS, upravo onom strankom koja je predvodila agresiju na BiH i čiju je politiku porazila Hrvatska. To je vidljivo na brojnim primjerima u unutarnje-političkim procesima u BiH. Istaknut ćemo primjer kad je jedan od vodećih dužnosnika SDS-a, Dragan Mektić, u funkciji ministra sigurnosti BiH, 2019. lažno optužio Hrvatsku da radi na islamističkoj radikalizaciji BiH. I to je radio u bliskoj suradnji i dogovoru s tadašnjim i današnjim ravnateljem Obavještajno-sigurnosne agencije BiH, Osmanom Mehmedagićem (ratnim tjelohraniteljem Alije Izetbegovića) o čemu postoje i javno objavljeni dokazi⁷. I danas velikobošnjački SDA i velikosrpski SDS pokušavaju s vlasti svrgnuti SNSD Milorada Dodika (koji uopće nije sudjelovao u srpskoj agresiji na BiH, ali koji autokratski upravlja tom strankom koja ima snažan nacionalni naboj). Uistinu čudni, i nadasve zanimljivi, savezi nastali na realnim političkim odnosima i bliskostima u BiH zbog čega se ne treba čuditi povezivanju HDZ BiH i SNSD. Ono što je iz ovog vidljivo je da uistinu postoje radikalni politički krugovi u BiH koji na svaki način pokušavaju radikalizirati situaciju kako bi pokušali protjerati iz BiH sve one koji nisu bh Bošnjaci, koji ne pristaju na njihove ucjene i koji ne vide budućnost u sukobima i netrpeljivostima. Uistinu je potreban snažan angažman međunarodne zajednice na de-radikalizaciji BH društva. S naglaskom na političare koji djeluju s pozicije velikobošnjačkog unitarizma i hegemonizma te koji svojim narativom samo radikaliziraju društvo te ionako složene međunacionalne odnose.

Službeni podaci o stanovništvu BiH (http://www.statistika.ba/?lang=en) ne govore o „zacementiranju“ nacionalnih odnosa u korist tzv „građanskog“ društva niti „etničkog čišćenja“. Čak i površni pogled na službene podatke govori da se radi o potpuno pogrešnoj tezi etničkog čišćenja, ali o trendu porasta broja bh Bošnjaka, i smanjivanja broja bh Srba i bh Hrvata u BiH⁸. Što je činjenica koju velikobošnjački unitarizma pokušava iskoristiti kako bi nametnuo vlastiti hegemoniju. Ovaj popis ukazuje i na još jednu bitnu odrednicu BH društva: čak se 96,3% popisanog stanovništva izjašnjava pripadnicima jednog od tri konstitutivna naroda. A o konstitutivnosti naroda se u demokratskim državama Europe ne raspravlja niti se problematizira. Posebno ne na način kako to rade velikobošnjački unitaristi. Prijetnjama i silom. Može se, i treba, razgovarati samo o modelima ispunjavanja te ustavne obveze,  a ne o njenom ukidanju. Problem ovakve velikobošnjačke unitarističke politike je taj da brojnost jednog naroda smatraju jedinim i isključivim mjerilom za određivanje razine utjecaja i upravljanja nekim društvom i državom. Moderne liberalne demokracije ne prihvaćaju isključivost kao temeljno a posebno ne kao konstruktivno načelo, već ga odbijaju kao izuzetno protu-demokratsku totalitarnu ideju koja ne vodi ka izgradnji prosperitetnih društava. I s kojom se ne može ići prema euro-atlantskim integracijama.

Ovakav stav da „oni koji se ne slažu sa mnom su protiv mene i kao takvima im prava koja imaju moraju biti poništena“, 80ih godina prošlog stoljeća doveli su do izrade poznatog Memoranduma⁹ SANU¹⁰, te u pokušaju realizacije odredbi Memoranduma u poltici Slobodana Miloševića te krvavoj agresiji Jugoslavije i Srbije na Sloveniju, Hrvatsku, Bosnu i Hercegovinu. U današnje je vrijeme to je obilježje politike poznate kao „putinizam“. Naime, „putinizam“ negira pravo na postojanje ukrajinskog naroda, ukrajinske države i traži njihovo asimiliranje, zbog razloga koji su u biti dosta slični razlozima koje u javnom diskursu koriste velikobošnjački hegemonisti.

3. Podrška evropskim integracijama i članstvu u EU kod građana Zapadnog Balkana je u drastičnom padu, tako u Srbiji iznosi svega 44% podrške članstvu te zemlje u EU. EU postaje izvor i moguće novo svjetsko žarište sigurnosnih problema zbog licemjernog i kalkulantskog odnosa naspram Zapadnog Balkana. 

Netočno. Nije EU odgovorna za nisku razinu potpore srbijanske javnosti ulasku Srbije u EU nego srbijanska vlast koja „sjedi na nekoliko stolica“ i koja, isto kao i velikobošnjački unitaristi, javno govori da želi u EU dok s druge strane radi sve da do tog procesa ne dođe. Naime, sustav vrijednosti, načela i uvjerenja na kojima se temelji EU jednostavno ne žele primijeniti na Srbiju i BiH jer bi time vrlo brzo izgubili mogućnost daljnje zloupotrebe vlasti.  

Drugi dio izjave predstavlja izravnu prijetnju sigurnosti EU. Posebno kad dolazi od onih koji se jezikom prijetnji rado služe i koriste argument snage kao opravdanje za svoje stavove. Na spomenutoj platformi je Bakir Izetbegović izabran za predsjednika SDA.¹¹ Žele li reći da će ponovo potaknuti islamistički radikalizam? Žele li poistovjetiti islamistički radikalizam i velikobošnjački unitarizam? Znamo koliko je Alija Izetbegović sa svojim najbližim suradnicima bio blizak s islamističkim radikalima i dokazanim teroristima dok su oni bili u sastavu Armije BiH. Ovo je samo dodatni dokaz koji govori o potrebi deradikalizacije velikobošnjačkih politika.

4. Republika Hrvatska je čak u pet presuda Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) presuđena, da je učestvovala u međunarodnom oružanom sukobu u BiH (agresiji) i u Udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu (UZP) prema BiH

Navedene presude, kao i brojne druge s tog suda, treba podrobno i u potpunosti pročitati kako bi se mogli donositi kvalitetni i točni zaključci. Izjava iz točke 4 je neistinita stoga što ICTY nikada nije sudio državama (nije imao mandat) a utvrdio je kako najviši hrvatski dužnosnici nisu počinili nikakvo kazneno djelo.¹² Na tom su sudu donošene svakakve odluke prema kojima se mogu donositi različiti zaključci u odnosu na sve sukobljene strane. Ostaje pak jasna povijesna činjenica: Hrvatska je snažno pomagala na svaki mogući način bh Bošnjake čak i kad su isti ugrožavali i napadali bh Hrvate. Bez Hrvatskih oružanih snaga, bh Bošnjaci bi danas bilo osuđeni na Sarajevski pašaluk. To priznaju i SAD u gore navedenim službenim dokumentima. Selektivnost u uporabi argumenata je još jedan od pokazatelja ciljanih dezinformacijskih aktivnosti.

5. Danas visoki predstavnik Christian Schmidt i OHR rade nešto potpuno drugo u odnosu na vrijeme i mandat tadašnjeg visokog predstavnika Valentina Inzka. Christian Schmidt u osnovi radi protiv visokog predstavnika (OHR) iz 2016.godine.

U praksi demokratskih država je da se određena zakonska rješenja, kad se u praksi pokažu nekvalitetnima i štetnima, mijenjaju na bolje. Proces njihove promjene se smatra pozitivnim i korisnim za demokraciju posebno ako je u skladu s prihvaćenim, i već korištenim procedurama. U demokratskim državama se također smatra da je namjerno ignoriranje i neprovođenje pravomoćnih sudskih odluka odraz ne demokratičnosti, hegemonije i zlonamjernosti prema onima koji trebaju dobiti zadovoljštinu promjenama zakonodavnog okvira. U ovom slučaju, povratka na izvorišne osnove Ustava BiH iz Daytona koji su nasilno mijenjani upravo od strane bivših OHR. Utvrđene greške se moraju ispraviti. Posebno kad imaju temelj u pravomoćnim sudskim odlukama na nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj razini. Njihovo neprihvaćanje i ignoriranje još je jedan dokaz koja pokazuje koliko je velikobošnjačkom unitarizmu stalo do pristupa EU kao i do BiH kao pravne i funkcionalne državne zajednice.

6. Analitičari smatraju…..

Nekoliko puta se u ovom pamfletu spominje ovakva izjava i pozivanje na neimenovane analitičare. To je praksa i obilježje onih koji nemaju drugih argumenata nego se pozivaju na opću imenicu pokušavajući pridružiti svojim argumentima brojnost „stručnih analitičara“. Argument koji to nije i koji to u ozbiljnim radovima nikad ne može proći kao činjenica. Naime, iza takvih opisa u najvećoj se mjeri krije težnja da se pokaže da osoba koje isto ili vrlo slično misle ima znatno više nego što ih u stvari jest čime se pokušava lažno stvoriti mentalitet neistinite i prividne moći te snage argumenata koji se koriste nakon takvog „dokaza znanstvenosti“. 

7. Visoki predstavnik mora biti svjestan, da ustupci Čoviću i Dodiku su ustupci Vladimiru Putinu i Rusiji i veliki rizik da u BiH dođe do obnavljanja sukoba. 

Već je pokazano i dokazano: ako surađujete sa Karadžićevim SDS-om (i javno i tajno, kao i za vrijeme srpske agresije na BiH, kao što je to ovdje vidljivo: Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: Dokumenti 1991.-1995. Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991.-1995. Truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina - Documents 1991-1995,  a koji su bili i ostali čvrsti oslonac ruske politike u BiH, onda optuživanje drugih bez konkretnih dokaza, samo govori o onima koji takve optužbe iznose. Kao i o njihovim stvarnim namjerama. O sprezi Rusije i Turske, čak i na vrlo bliskoj razini samih predsjednika Putina i Erdogana ne treba posebno pisati. Poznato je da je Turska izbačena iz projekta razvoja borbenog zrakoplova F-35 upravo zbog svoje sklonosti Rusiji i kupnji ruskih sustava za protuzračnu zaštitu S-400 usprkos traženjima SAD i zemalja saveznica iz NATO-a da to ne radi¹³.

A sukobe u BiH spominju i potiču samo velikobošnjački unitaristi što je vidljivo po njihovim javno izrečenim izjavama ovih dana. Jedino oni prijete čak i ratnim djelovanjima, Kad su OHR-u prijetili iz SNSD onda se odmah tražila reakcija pravne države (slobodna-bosna.ba: SDA JE ODMAH REAGOVALA: Prijetnje smrću Christianu Schmidtu). Danas, kad se istoj osobi prijeti od strane bh Bošnjaka, te su prijetnje dobrodošle (Histerija u BiH: Bošnjački korpus poludio zbog promjena izbornog zakona, spominju se luđačke košulje... A što to visoki predstavnik Schmidt zapravo želi mijenjati?; U Sarajevu se pred sjedištem ureda Christiana Schmidta okupilo 2000 prosvjednika, pridružili se i istaknuti bošnjački političari) 

8. NATO ne želi poslati pozivnicu BiH za članstvo

Bilo bi dobro da velikobošnjački unitaristi shvate razloge zbog kojih se ne donosi odluka o pozivanju BiH u članstvo NATO saveza.

9. Dodvoravanje razbijačima BiH i putem nametanja Izbornog zakona je uvod u ukrajinski scenarij i krajnje je vrijeme da SAD i pojedine države EU shvate da su Republika Hrvatska i Mađarska ruski „trojanski konji“ u EU i NATO-u i čak s ciljem izazivanja konflikta u BiH.

Velikobošnjački unitaristi pokazuju da jednostavno nisu niti spremni niti žele biti dio EU. Način na koji komuniciraju, riječi koje koriste, pozivi na nasilje, te uporaba dezinformacijskih tehnika pokazuje njihovu nedoraslost svoj složenosti trenutka pred kojom se nalazi BiH. I to upravo zbog njihove isključivosti i želje za nasilnim nametanjem situacije da u BiH mogu postojati jedino bh Bošnjaci i koji će poduzeti sve aktivnosti, demokratske ali i one nedemokratske da nametnu svoju volju drugima. Optužbe da je Hrvatska „ruski trojanski konj“ u EU nemamo potrebe komentirati. Odnos Ukrajine prema Hrvatskoj to jasno govori (dnevnik.hr: Pogledajte kako je izgledao susret Plenkovića i Zelenskog: "Hvala vam na svemu što činite..."). Treba samo znati i htjeti čitati istinite vijesti. 

10. (…) a ne da slijedi politiku bivše njemačke savezne kancelarke Angele Merkel i politiku ruskog utjecaja (…)

Politika Angele Merkel se u ovom trenutku ne može realno ocjenjivati jer je puno tendencioznih izjava, kao što su to ove, koje to priječe. Angela Merkel je vodila politiku snažne EU, koja počiva na suradnji i komunikaciji, na diplomatskoj i gospodarskoj suradnji s ciljem stvaranja jake i sposobne EU. Ni Hrvatska nije uvijek bila zadovoljna njenom politikom. Ali to ne znači da je ona bila takva kakvom je sad, u biti proruski interesni krugovi žele prikazati, pokušavajući unijeti dodatne podjele u EU u skladu sa svojim interesima. 

11. Generalno u najavljenoj odluci OHR-a o izmjenama Izbornog zakona BiH se jednom konstitutivnom narodu (Hrvati) pojačavaju prava na dijelu teritorije u Federaciji BiH, dok se istom narodu umanjuju prava na drugom dijelu teritorije Federacije BiH. Time se diskriminiraju Hrvati u ne-Hercegovačkim kantonima, a Bošnjaci i Srbi u zapadnoj  Hercegovini. Opravdanim se postavlja pitanje, šta je sa onima koji se ne izjašnjavaju kao pripadnici nekog od konstitutivnih naroda? Visoki predstavnik bi definitivno uveo legalizaciju ratnih politika i politike HDZ, gdje su Hrvati većina - princip proporcionalnosti,  gdje su brojčana manjina - princip pariteta.

Kad se autori ovakvog pamfleta počnu brinuti za prava Hrvata u BiH, na način na koji se brinu, to istovremeno izaziva podsmijeh ali i ozbiljnu zabrinutost. Upravo je situacija obrnuta. Ovakvim se odlukama jamči pravo bh Hrvatima i bh Srbima da ih neće, kao što je to više puta i dokazano, preglasati bh Bošnjaci matematičkom distribucijom dijela vlastitih glasova i izborom nelegitimnih zastupnika u različita državna tijela. Ukažimo samo na jedan primjer (pored primjera notornog Željka Komšića). Na području Bosansko-podrinjske županije žive 24 osobe koje se nacionalno izjašnjavaju kao bh Hrvati. Na posljednjim izborima za Dom narod Parlamenta Federacije BiH, na listi „Goraždanske stranke“, izabran je Edin Fejzić koji je ukupno dobio 319 preferencijalnih glasova. Što je 13,3 puta više od ukupnog broja glasova Hrvata u toj županiji. Edin Fejzić nije legitimni predstavnik bh Hrvata. Edin Fejzić nije jedini koji je zloupotrijebio trenutne odredbe izbornog zakona koje nisu sastavni dio Daytonskih mirovnih sporazuma na način na koji danas egzistiraju. Promijenjeni su odlukom OHR-a. Koju novi OHR pokušava ispraviti. Problem je u činjenici da bh Bošnjaci ne žele demokratsku i slobodnu BiH. Pokažimo na jednom jednostavnom primjeru razliku između društvenog određenja u Hrvatskoj i velikobošnjačkih unitarista u BiH. Hrvatska na svakim izborima za Sabor bira u svoj sastav i osam pripadnika iz reda nacionalnih manjina koje žive u Hrvatskoj. Oni se biraju u posebnoj XII. izbornoj jedinici. Na stranici https://www.izbori.hr/site/UserDocsImages/479 dostupi su rezultati izbora za Sabor. Zastupnici iz reda srpske manjine u RH se biraju u prosjeku s oko 8000 glasova. Zastupnik talijanske manjine s manje od 900 glasova. Zastupnik iz reda manjina gdje se nalaze i bh Bošnjaci se bira s nešto više od 1700 glasova. Na izborima se pokazalo da je bilo stranačkih listi koje su ukupno dobile više desetaka tisuća glasova ali zbog izbornih pragova po pojedinim izbornim jedincima nisu dobili i zastupnike. Zamislimo situaciju da se neke od tih stranka dogovore ta da za sljedeće izbore odluče nekoga od svojih članova prijaviti kao kandidate na listama za predstavnike nacionalnih manjina u Hrvatskoj. S obzirom na broj glasova koji na razini cijele Hrvatske imaju, sasvim sigurno bi uspjeli dobiti nekoliko, ako ne i svih osam, u ovo slučaju „manjinskih“ zastupnika. Ovakvu manipulaciju s izbornim procesom i njegovom zloupotrebom bi Hrvatska javnost u potpunosti osudila i ne prihvatila jer bi to bilo izigravanje prava koja Ustav i zakon daje drugima. Razlika je upravo u tom odnosu: izigravanje i zloupotreba izbornog zakonodavstva gdje većinski konstitutivni narod zloupotrebljava, naknadno definirani, izborni zakon na uštrb drugih konstitutivnih naroda se od tog većinskog naroda prihvaća i tumači kao potreba. Čime se izravno podriva Ustav, ustavni poredak i budućnost BiH kao društva i države. BiH je zbog takvih zlonamjernih aktivnosti i dalje disfunkcionalna država. I takva će ostati dok postoje težnje za njenom radikalizacijom i majorizacijom jednog naroda u odnosu na druge.

Treba jasno naglasiti da Hrvati u BiH nisu manjina nego konstitutivni narod. Jednakopravan po svim pravima kao i bh Srbi i bh Bošnjaci. Drugo je pitanje da velikobošnjački unitaristi žele svesti bh Hrvate, kao i bh Srbe, na status nacionalne manjine. I to je jedno od ključnih pitanja oko kojih se ne može postići konsenzus jer velikobošnjački unitaristi ne drže do potpisanih međunarodnih dokumenata i vode politiku koja teži produbljivanju daljnjih podjela u BiH.

12. Najavljena odluka OHR o izmjenama izbornog zakona, bez obzira na njene druge aspekte poput otklanjanja blokada u implementaciji izbornih rezultata, produbljuje etničke podjele u zemlji i povećava diskriminaciju kroz dalje snaženje instituta konstitutivnih naroda i tzv. legitimnog predstavljanja.

Ova odluka sprječava daljnje nametanje nacionalnih podjela i negiranja prava drugih, konstitutivnih i ravnopravnih naroda u BiH. Ovakva odluka smanjuje razinu dokazane zloupotrebe izbornih demokratskih procesa koja se pod parolom „borbe za građansku državu“ svode na velikobošnjački unitarizam. Na onaj unitarizam koji je težio ka stvaranju Velike Srbije i unitarizam koji je pokrenuo proces krvavog raspada Jugoslavije,. Taj unitarizam je šteta i pogibeljan, kako se dokazalo u povijesti, za njegove nositelje i promicatelje.

Legitimnost kao pojam nije takozvani pojam. On ili jest ili nije. S obzirom na presudu Ustavnog suda BiH u „slučaju Ljubić“ (U 23/14), legitimnost je legitiman pojam koji proizlazi iz konstitutivnosti navedene u Ustavu BiH. Velikobošnjački unitaristi su već puno puta pokazali sklonost preslagivanju izbornih podataka i prebacivanje glasača po različitim izbornim jedincima kako bi izbornim inženjeringom postigli maksimum zloupotrijebivši demokraciju u njenoj punini. To se već vidjelo i na različitim izborima u Bih i na posljednjim izborima za grad Mostar. 

13. Šta bi se desilo npr. u Njemačkoj kada bi se dva mjeseca prije izbora za njemački Bundestag bila promijenjena izborna pravila?

I ovdje se namjerno postavlja krivo pitanje kako bi se iskoristila metoda dezinformiranja zamjenom teza. Naime, nije pitanje promjene izbornih pravila u Njemačkoj dva mjeseca prije izbora? Pravo je pitanje bi li Njemačka dopustila da se pravomoćne odluke sudova u vezi s utvrđenim izbornim nepravilnostima koje su posljedice protuustavnih, naknadno unesenih, izbornih odredbi ne provode? Bi li Njemačka dozvolila da pojedine stranke namjerno opstruiraju proces demokratizacije društva i države i namjerno ignoriraju sudske odluke? Odgovor je jednostavan: kao i u slučaju svake demokratske države i društva, takva se aktivnost ne bi dozvolila. Ona bi se tumačila onako kako se samo može i mora tumačiti: kao protudemokratska i hegemonistička protuzakonita djelovanja pod parolom stvaranja „građanske države“. 

ZAKLJUČAK

Objavljena „analiza“ IFIMES-a, kao i većina njihovih „analiza“, sadrži cijeli niz dezinformacija te logičkih i činjeničnih pogrešaka zbog kojih se treba upitati o stvarnim namjerama autora i institucije koja stoji iza ovakvih uradaka. Tekst nije objektivan, nije realan, nije točan, nepouzdan je kao izvor podataka, a pritom je mjestimice vrlo konfuzan. Organizacije koje za sebe tvrde da su znanstvene i istraživačke zaboravljaju činjenicu izrečenu u poslovici "historia, (est) magistra vitae". Autori ovog pamfleta, tzv. „analitičari“, nisu ništa naučili iz krvavog raspada Jugoslavije i srpskih agresije na Sloveniju, Hrvatsku, BiH te kasnije na Kosovo i Crnu Goru. Stavovi koje zastupaju, način kako ih opravdavaju, narativ kojim inzistiraju na prihvaćanju jedino njihovih zahtjeva, prijetnje koje upućuju neodoljivo podsjećaju na sve ono što smo već vidjeli u bivšoj Jugoslaviji od 80ih godina: od pisanja memoranduma SANU, inzistiranja na politici „jedan čovjek-jedan glas“, negiranja postojanja (a time i njihovih prava) drugih i drugačijih, prijetnji sukobima i ratovima. To je retorika koja je dovela do krvavog raspada Jugoslavije. To nije retorika koja je bila nazočna u tadašnjoj Češkoslovačkoj republici. To je retorika netolerantnih, isključivih, nedemokratskih, neznanstvenih, tendencioznih, totalitarnih struktura, organizacija i osoba. 

Isto kao što su umni i znanstvenim načelima dosljedni znanstvenici uspjeli dokazati da naš solarni sustav nije geocentričan nego heliocentričan, tako i velikobošnjački unitaristi moraju shvatiti da se u središte integrativnih procesa u BiH mora staviti interes BiH i svih njenih stanovnika (pripadnike tri naroda i manjina) a ne samo bh Bošnjaka. Moraju shvatiti da u BiH žive, djeluju i rade tri jednakopravna konstitutivna naroda, i s manjinama kojih je tek nešto više od 3%, zajedno trebaju graditi budućnost BiH. I to za pripadnike svih naroda i manjina. 

Građansko društvo koje velikobošnjački unitaristi zagovaraju nije građansko društvo koje se kao takvo podrazumijeva u Europi (koje je nastalo na temelju nacionalnih država). Njihovo viđenje građanskog društva je sve samo ne građansko. Ono je etnocentrično, predstavlja spoj velikobošnjačkog nacionalizma, socijalističkog etatizma, jugoslavenskog unitarizma i (pan)islamizma¹⁴, zanemarujući i ignorirajući postojanje drugih i drugačijih. Upravo ono društvo kakvo su velikosrbi htjeli dobiti transformacijom Jugoslavije u Veliku Srbiju. Takvom politikom velikobošnjaci koji se protive demokratizaciji društva, pokazuju da niti shvaćaju niti žele prihvatiti cijeli onaj sustav načela, vrijednosti i uvjerenja na kojima počiva EU, gdje je različitost svojstvo i osobina koja spaja, a ne razdvaja, da se budućnost gradi zajedničkim djelovanjima, da se izazovi rješavaju razgovor te iskrenom i otvorenom komunikacijom a ne prijetnjama nasiljem, sukobima, ubojstvima, ratovima. Te osobe koje u svojim istupima pozivaju na nasilje trebaju shvatiti da se u Europi odavno i shvatilo i prihvatilo da osobe koje se u javnom nastupu koriste takvim rječnicima ne smatraju pouzdanim ni sigurnim partnerima. I da se penaliziraju.

Iz konstitutivnosti triju naroda nužno proistječe i njihova međusobna ustavnopravna i institucionalna jednakopravnost. I legitimnost. Bez legitimnosti nema demokracije. Nema suradnje na pozitivnim osnovama. A osnovna svrha izbornog zakona je osigurati legitimitet (ustavnost) i legalitet (zakonitost) izabranih političkih predstavnika. A to velikobošnjački hegemonistički elementi očito ne žele. 

Bez dogovora tri konstitutivna naroda u BiH nema bolje budućnosti za BiH. Svako drugačije, posebno nasilno, nametanje jedne istine vodi kao ozbiljnim sukobima i izazovima. Zato ponavljamo: u EU se razgovor i dogovor o izazovima smatra nužnim i jedinim načinom rješavanja tih izazova. Bez prijetnji, prisile, netolerancije, ucjena. To bi bar trebali znati oni koji žive i rade u EU, koji pišu ovakve pamflete, a koji još očito nisu prihvatili europski sustav vrijednosti. 

Još je 2016. u jednom od objavljenih članaka u časopisu National Security and the Future na temu BiH napisano u zaključku ono što se i danas događa te što priječi demokratizaciju BiH. Stoga ćemo cijeli zaključak prenijeti¹⁵:

„Hipotezu o Bosni i Hercegovini kao nedovršenoj državi i podijeljenom društvu, bez naznaka kako bi se uskoro mogao postići temeljni konsenzus predstavnika tri naroda o zajedničkim vrijednostima kao legitimacijskoj osnovi demokratskog političkog poretka, nije moguće opovrgavati ukazivanjem na etnonacionalističke politike najznačajnijih političkih stranaka, a prevladavanje takvog stanja zazivati poštivanjem načela građanstva, što je ključni bošnjački argument u suprotstavljanju razgovorima o ustavnoj reformi. Također, nemoguće je doći do prihvatljivog rješenja ni srpskom čvrstom obranom entitetske paradržavnosti. Bosanskohercegovački Hrvati pokazuju se kao najveći postdejtonski gubitnici, budući da u entitetskom parlamentu teško mogu utjecati na donošenje političkih odluka i preostaje im samo načelo veta na odluke od vitalnog nacionalnog interesa. U takvom neravnopravnom položaju i interpretacija vitalnog nacionalnog interesa u pravilu se odvija u uvjetima stalne napetosti. Nacionalne i konfesionalne podjele u BiH povijesno su ukorijenjene i ne treba im pridavati normativistički karakter, već je prihvatiti kao činjenicu i tek u međusobnom dijalogu može se vidjeti je li presudna kada je riječ o nemogućnosti uspostave političke zajednice kao ključnog uvjeta funkcioniranja političkog sustava. Dakle, posve je razvidno kako u BiH trenutačno egzistiraju tri zasebne  političke zajednice kao i tri različita viđenja razvoja demokracije koja se ne može uspješno razvijati bez državnog uređenja koje će biti prihvatljivo svim konstitutivnim narodima. Nadalje, uvažavajući potencijalnu opasnost od daljnje dezintegracije, nema znanstvenih argumenata kako bi koncept federalizacije udaljio višeetničku BiH od uspostave političke zajednice, već se uglavnom u javnom prostoru „ratuje“ uvriježenim metaforama i dezinformacijama. Štoviše, mišljenja smo, ukoliko postoji mogućnost konstitucije legitimne političke zajednice, onda je federalizacija uz jačanje državnih institucija, jedini put prema integraciji. Grupni identiteti ne mogu se potisnuti ili izbrisati građanskim individualističkim određenjima, oko čega se danas slažu i suvremeni liberalni teoretičari. Pitanja povijesnog nasljeđa i njihovih interpretacija imaju iznimnu važnost za jednu etničku skupinu, a ključno je pitanje mogu li u skoroj budućnosti svi konstitutivni narodi u BiH postići suglasnost o onim zajedničkim vrijednostima nužnim za uspostavu političke zajednice. Demokracija sigurno nije upitna vrijednost, ali svakako je nedostatna i svoju je važnu simboličku ulogu odigrala 90-ih godina kada se urušavao autokratski jednopartijski režim. Ne držimo mogućim ni konsenzus oko načela ZAVNOBIH-a kao integracijske vrijednosti, isto kao što se na obzoru ne nazire neki novi „ujediniteljski politički mit“.¹⁶

Budućnost BiH je u potpuno ostvarenoj konsocijacijskoj demokraciji. Ni manje ni više od toga. Nadamo se da za demokratsku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, pravnu i prosperitetnu državu za sva tri naroda i manjine koji u njoj žive još uvijek ima vremena. I nade.

Dodatno pitanje koje se postavlja (nakon ovog kao i niza drugih dezinformacijskih testova i „analitičkih uradaka“) je zaslužuju li ovakve interesne organizacije biti dio međunarodnih organizacija kojima je cilj gradnja a ne razgradnja, istina a ne neistina, točnost i potpunost, a ne netočnost i djelomičnost. Ovakvi pamfleti pokazuju i dokazuju ispravnost naše namjere o osnivanju IIHS kao nevladine, nestranačke, neprofitne udruge građana koji se bore protiv dezinformacija kojima se pokušava obasipati hrvatski i međunarodni javni prostor.

Zagreb, 26.srpanj 2022.

Doc.dr.sc. Gordan Akrap
Institut za istraživanje hibridnih sukoba

• Članak u PDF formatu

¹⁶  Vedran Matošić: Bosna i Hercegovina – Nedovršena država, podijeljeno društvo, i nemogućnost konstituiranja političke zajednice, National Security and the Future, Vol 17, No 3, 2016, str. 7-30, https://nsf-journal.hr/online-issues/focus/id/1216

SECURITY ANALYSIS -  JULY 2022

In July 2020, IFIMES from Ljubljana published one of a series of disinformative and inaccurate analyses regarding the elections in Croatia (ifimes.org: Parlamentarni izbori u Hrvatskoj 2020: Hrvatska u još većem raskoraku između prošlosti i budućnosti). We analysed the IFIMES analysis in detail (https://zagrebsecurityforum.com/analysis/id/3094) and showed that it is full of inaccuracies, untruths and prejudices. Certainly, one doesn’t expect this from an organization which presents itself as scientific and professional. In the meantime, this organization has published several other articles which are equally inaccurate, unobjective, opinionated and malicious in terms of goals that they wish to achieve.

The last in a series of their quasi-scientific analyses was published on 21 July 2022 on the topic of planned changes to the electoral law in BIH and its harmonization with the judgments of international¹ courts and courts of BIH. IFIMES begins this “analysis”, as well as others in which they purport to be the authors, with a note that only the most important and interesting parts are extracted from an extensive analysis (or rather, para-political hoaxes). We did not notice that these analyses were ever published in full.

Neither this analysis, nor other works published there have an author's signature. In a way, this is understandable, because serious scientists would be ashamed to sign such a pamphlet full of misinformation. In order to avoid misunderstandings, at the very beginning we want to define the term disinformation, in order to more easily explain and prove why numerous statements written in the IFIMES analysis are actually disinformation:

Deliberately distorted, incomplete and partially or completely incorrect information, the client and real author of which is hidden, whose goal is to induce the target audience, through influence on the cognitive level, to make decisions that cause harm to them, i.e. short-term and/or long-term changes to their public knowledge corpus².    

It is also necessary to repeat the theorems on disinformation in order to make it easier to understand the goals that disinformers want to achieve with such tricks:

1st theorem: If the public (user) accepts disinformation as truth, then the disinformation is true in its consequences.

2nd theorem: If the public (user) receives objective information as untrue, then the objective information is untrue (false) in its consequences³. 

From the above stated there comes the need to publicly present misinformation as such, identify its authors as well as the hidden intentions of the authors, because only in this way can modern societies and states effectively fight misinformation campaigns and prevent their possible negative impact. We will now single out a few key disinformation messages, point out their short-term and long-term objectives, identify the real senders of this disinformation, while taking care not to change the context of the written content and not to manipulate the sentences.

1. "It has been more than a decade that the American administration left Bosnia and Herzegovina into the care of the EU, which more than obviously missed a historic opportunity to take the relevant steps towards a prosperous BIH. Not only did that not happen, but the EU today created an identical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it did in the Ukraine before Russian invasion. The sequence of actions of EU officials towards BIH as seen so far points to a high corruption risk, as well other risks contingent upon a possible imposition of the Election Law in BIH."

It is untrue that BIH has been abandoned by the US administration and left solely to the EU. Likewise, it is untrue that the US is not trying to do anything in order to solve the numerous and deep problems that burden the future of BIH and are directly related to the abuse of the electoral process by BIH Bosniak parties⁴ which are inspired by the Great Bosniak unitary politics. Let us just remember the many activities and solutions that Gabriel Escobar⁵ has tried to arrange in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he has always encountered a wall of misunderstanding, ignoring and rejection by Bosniak politicians. He is still active in attempting to find solutions to these serious problems. On the other hand, the words used in this “analysis” aiming to accuse the EU, even for the Russian aggression against Ukraine, exceed all limits of realistic and objective assessment. The intention of the “authors” is to completely ignore the efforts of the EU, which, as we all know, are in line with the fundamental values on which the EU rests. Already in the first sentence of this “analysis” the question should be asked: are the authors of this analysis people who really want BIH to become part of the EU, or do they aim for EU accession only as an euphemism for the creation of a theocratic society, a Bosniak nation-state? On the other hand, it is necessary to draw a parallel with the involvement of the USA in stopping the war in Croatia and BIH. The activities of the USA at that time towards Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on the desire of the US administration to show the Islamic world that the policy of the USA is not anti-Islamic, no matter what. In accordance with this thesis, whatever Izetbegović and the Bosniaks of Bosnia and Herzegovina do, the USA will protect them (cia.gov: Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency). Even the then representatives of the international community who negotiated with Izetbegović knew about his tendency toward fickleness and change of opinion⁶. 

The authors do not understand the fundamental system of principles, values and beliefs on which the EU rests, that is that conflicts should be de-escalated and resolved by the use and force of arguments in the form of diplomatic processes. These processes, in EU political philosophy, are never too time-consuming, as long as they prevent the escalation of crisis and its turning into riots, street violence and wars. If the authors, who supposedly live in the EU, do not understand, or maybe do not wish to understand this, obviously adhering to the tenet that the argument of strength is of a higher order than the strength of the argument, then such experts and politicians have no place in the community of peoples who resolve their issues through discussions, rather than scheming, fraud and violence.

2. “The Dayton Accords cannot by itself bring about serious changes, as their ethnic basis (literally) protects the old political elites, led by warlords who became eternal politicians. Everything is reduced to ethnicity, namely the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats along with a strong presence of crime and corruption. There is no place for young and advanced people in this formula. If the announcements about the imposition of the Electoral Law by the OHR ever come true in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the consequence will be the a lebanonization of the Electoral Law. Instead of Sunnis, Shiites and Christians as in the Lebanese case, we will have permanently cemented Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in BiH.”

Again, a section full of falsehoods. The truth is completely different. The Dayton Accords were reached, among other, thanks to a strong commitment of Croatia and the results of its armed, intelligence and diplomatic efforts, i.e. victory over the armed forces of the Serbs. If it weren’t for its successes on the battlefield, along from those in the field of diplomacy and intelligence, which were won with the help of allies, of course, the BIH Bosniaks would be reduced to less than ¼ of the BiH territory. Such a fate was intended for them by the Bosnian Serbs led by the SDS party, whose president and leader was Radovan Karadžić. Left to its own resources, the BIH army could not have carried out a single liberation operation. This brief sketch of events shows the absurdity of accusations against the international community, especially against the EU. For several years now, we witness a strong cooperation of the Greater-Bosniak party SDA with the Serbian party SDS, the very party that led the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and whose policy was defeated by Croatia. This is visible in numerous examples of internal political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will point out the example when Dragan Mektić, one of the leading officials of the SDS, who in the function of the Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2019 falsely accused Croatia of supporting Islamist radicalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a slander arranged in close cooperation with Osman Mehmedagić, Alija Izetbegović’s bodyguard during the war and currently director of the Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a case on which there is published evidence⁷. Even today, the Greater-Bosniak SDA and the Great Serbian SDS are trying to oust from power Milorad Dodik’s SNSD, a party which did not participate in the Serbian aggression on BIH at all, but which is actually governed autocratically and has a strong national charge. These are truly strange and most interesting alliances formed around real political relations and affinities in BIH, which is why we should not be surprised by the connection between HDZ BIH and SNSD. From what has been shown, it follows that there really are radical political circles in BIH which are trying to radicalize the situation in order to expel from BIH all who are not BIH Bosniaks, who do not agree to their blackmailing and who do not see a future except one of conflict and intolerance. Therefore, a strong engagement of the international community is needed for the de-radicalization of the BIH society, with an emphasis on politicians acting from the position of Greater-Bosniak unitarianism and hegemony, and who only radicalize the society already marred by complex inter-ethnic relations with their narrative.

The official data on the population of BIH (http://www.statistika.ba/?lang=en) do not speak of cementing national relations in favour of the so-called "civil" society nor in favour of "ethnic cleansing". Even a cursory review of the official data shows that the thesis of today’s ethnic cleansing is completely mistaken, but instead there is a trend of increasing the number of BH Bosniaks, and decreasing the number of BH Serbs and BH Croats in BIH. This trend is exploited by the Greater-Bosniak unitarians in order to impose own hegemony. The census data also point to another important determinant of BH society, namely that as many as 96.3% of the census population declare themselves to be members of one of the three constitutive nations. And the constitutionality of the peoples is not discussed or problematized in the democratic Europe. Especially not in the way that the Greater-Bosniak unitarians do it, which is through threats and force. One can and should, therefore, only discuss models for fulfilling this constitutional obligation, not its abolition. The problem of this type of Greater-Bosniak unitarian policy is that the size of a nation is considered to be the only and exclusive criterion for determining the level of influence and management of a society and state. Modern liberal democracies do not accept exclusivity as a fundamental, and especially not as a constructive principle, but reject it as an extremely anti-democratic totalitarian idea that does not aim at building prosperous societies. And apparently, with such an attitude one cannot move towards Euro-Atlantic integrations.

The attitude that those who do not agree with me are against me and as such their rights must be revoked led in the 80s of the last century to the drafting of the famous SANU⁸ Memorandum⁹,  and in the attempt to realize the provisions of the Memorandum in the politics of Slobodan Milošević and the bloody aggression of Yugoslavia and Serbia on Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nowadays, this feature of politics is known as Putinism. Namely, Putinism denies the right of existence of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian state, and seeks their assimilation for reasons which are essentially similar to the reasons used in public discourse by the Greater-Bosniak hegemonists.

3. “A decreasing number of citizens in the Western Balkans support European integration and EU membership, so for instance in Serbia only 44% of citizens want their country's membership in the EU. The EU is becoming a possible new global focus of security problems due to its hypocritical and calculating attitude towards the Western Balkans.”

Incorrect. The EU is not responsible for the low support of the Serbian public for Serbia's entry into the EU, but rather it is the Serbian government which is a notorious fence-sitter and which, just like the Greater-Bosniak unitarians, publicly speaks in favour of EU-integration, while on the other hand does everything to prevent it from happening . Why? Because they do not want to apply the system of values, principles and beliefs on which the EU is based to Serbia and BIH, as this would lead to their potential demise and loss of the ability to further abuse power.

The second part of the statement represents a direct threat to the security of the EU, especially when uttered by those who are happy to use the language of threats and use the argument of power to justify their positions. Bakir Izetbegović was elected president of the SDA on the aforementioned platform.¹⁰ Do they mean by this that they will re-invigorate Islamist radicalism? Do they want to equate Islamist radicalism with Greater-Bosniak unitarianism? We know how close Alija Izetbegović and his closest associates were to Islamist radicals and proven terrorists while they were part of the BIH Army. This is just one more piece of evidence that speaks in favour of the need for the de-radicalization of the Greater-Bosniak politics.

4. “In as many as five judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the judgement passed on the Republic of Croatia was that it had participated in the international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (aggression) and in the joint criminal enterprise (JCE) towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The aforementioned judgments, as well as numerous others from that court, should be read in detail and in full in order to be able to draw accurate conclusions. The statement from point 4 is untrue because the ICTY never tried states (it had no mandate for that), and it established that the highest Croatian officials did not commit a criminal offense. Many judgements were passed at that court, which enable various conclusions in relation to all the conflicting parties. However, a clear historical fact remains: Croatia helped the BIH Bosniaks in every possible way, even when they threatened and attacked the BIH Croats. Without the Croatian Armed Forces, the Bosniaks of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be condemned to the less than ¼ of the BiH territory. This is recognized by the USA in the official documents mentioned above. Selectivity in the use of arguments is another indicator of targeted disinformation operations.

5. “Today, High Representative Christian Schmidt and the OHR are doing something completely different compared to the time and mandate of Valentin Inzko, the former High Representative. Christian Schmidt has basically been working against the High Representative (OHR) from 2016.”

In the practice of democratic countries, certain legal solutions, when they prove to be of poor quality and harmful in practice, are changed. In order to try to find better solutions. The process of their change is considered positive and beneficial for democracy, especially if it is in accordance with the accepted and already used procedures. In democratic countries, it is also considered that the deliberate ignoring and non-implementation of final court verdict is a reflection of undemocratic, hegemonistic and malicious behaviour towards those who need to benefit from changes in the legislative framework. In this case, it would be a return to the original foundations of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Dayton, which were forcibly changed precisely by the former OHR. The errors found must be corrected. Especially when they have a basis in legally binding court decisions/verdicts at the national and international level. Their non-acceptance and ignoring is another proof that shows how much the Greater-Bosniak unitarianism cares about the EU accession as well about BIH itself as a legal and functional state union.

6. “The analysts believe...”

Several times in this pamphlet this statement is mentioned, and references are made to unnamed analysts. This is a typical practice and feature of those who have no real arguments, but refer to unnamed “analysts” to support their case. Of course, the arguments they use are no arguments, and can never pass as fact in serious written works. Behind such persuasive descriptions there is mirage aiming to show that there are significantly more people who think in the same or similar way than there actually are, which in further analysis is an attempt to fabricate a mentality of apparent power and strength of the arguments construed and clothed in supposed scientificity.

7. “The High Commissioner must be aware that compromises made towards Čović and Dodik are also compromises towards Vladimir Putin and Russia, and that this creates a great risk of a renewed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

It has already been shown and proven that if you cooperate with Karadzic's SDS, both publicly and secretly, as well as during the Serbian aggression on BIH, as shown  here academia.edu: Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: Dokumenti 1991.-1995. Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991.-1995. Truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina - Documents 1991-1995), which was and remains a solid pillar of Russian policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if you accuse others without concrete evidence, that only speaks of those who make such accusations. It speaks also about their real intentions. The relationship between Russia and Turkey is not worth even writing about, just as the very close relationship of the two presidents, Putin and Erdogan themselves. It is known that Turkey was kicked out of the F-35 fighter jet development project, because of its preference for Russia and the purchase of Russian S-400 air defence systems despite requests from the US and NATO allies not to do so.¹¹ 

That the conflicts in BIH are encouraged only by the Greater-Bosniak unitarians is becoming evident from their public statements these days. It is only them who threaten with violence, even warlike actions, but when the OHR was threatened by the SNSD, then the reaction of the rule of law was immediately required (slobodna-bosna.ba: SDA JE ODMAH REAGOVALA: Prijetnje smrću Christianu Schmidtu).

Today, when the same person is threatened by BIH Bosniaks, those threats seem to be welcome (tportal.hr: Histerija u BiH: Bošnjački korpus poludio zbog promjena izbornog zakona, spominju se luđačke košulje... A što to visoki predstavnik Schmidt zapravo želi mijenjati?; tportal.hr: U Sarajevu se pred sjedištem ureda Christiana Schmidta okupilo 2000 prosvjednika, pridružili se i istaknuti bošnjački političari). 

8. “NATO does not want to send a membership invitation to BIH” 

It would be good if the Greater-Bosniak unitarians understood NATO’s reasons for not making a decision to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the alliance.

9. “The smooth-talk behaviour towards the hooligans of BiH and through the imposition of the Election Law is an introduction to the Ukrainian scenario, and it is high time that the USA and some EU states understand that Croatia and Hungary are Russian Trojan horses in the EU and NATO, even with the aim of provoking a conflict in BiH.”

The Greater-Bosniak unitarians show that they are simply not ready to be part of the EU, nor do they want to be. The way they communicate, the words they use, their calls to violence, and the use of disinformation techniques show their inadequacy to handle this complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And that is precisely because of their exclusivity and desire to forcefully impose a situation where only BIH Bosniaks can exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So it should be only them who undertake all activities, democratic as well as non-democratic and  impose their will on others. We have no need to comment on the accusations that Croatia is a "Russian Trojan horse" in the EU. Ukraine's relationship with Croatia clearly speaks how things stand in this respect (dnevnik.hr: Pogledajte kako je izgledao susret Plenkovića i Zelenskog: "Hvala vam na svemu što činite..."). One only needs to follow the news.

10. “… and not to follow the policy of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the policy of Russian influence …”

Angela Merkel's policy cannot be evaluated realistically at this moment because there are many tendentious statements, such as these, that prevent it. Angela Merkel led the policy of a strong EU, which is based on cooperation and communication, on diplomatic and economic cooperation with the aim of creating a strong and capable EU. Croatia was not always satisfied with her policy either, but that does not mean that it is trying, as the pro-Russian interest circles want to portray it, to introduce additional divisions into the EU in accordance with their particular interests.

11. “In the announced decision of the OHR on the amendments to the Election Law of BIH, the rights of one constituent people (Croats) on one part of the territory of the BIH Federation are strengthened, while the same people's rights are reduced on another part of the territory of the Federation. This is a discrimination against Croats in non-Herzegovinian cantons, and against Bosniaks and Serbs in western Herzegovina. Therefore, the following question is justified: what about those who do not declare themselves as members of one of the constitutive nations? The High Commissioner would definitely introduce the legalization of war policies and the HDZ policy on territories in which the Croats are the majority, and the principle of proportionality or parity where they are a numerical minority.”

When the authors of such a pamphlet start to worry about the rights of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the way they do, it causes ridicule and concern at the same time. Namely, the actual situation is exactly the opposite. Current framework guarantees the right of BIH Croats and BIH Serbs not to be outvoted by BIH Bosniaks through the mathematical distribution of a part of their own votes and the election of illegitimate representatives to various state bodies, as has been proven a number of times. Let's point to just one example (in addition to the example of the notorious Željko Komšić). There are 24 people living in the area of the Bosansko-Podrinjska County who identify themselves as BH Croats. In the last elections for the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Edin Fejzić was elected on the list of the Goražde Party, and received a total of 319 preferential votes. This result is 13.3 times more than the total number of votes of Croats in that county. Edin Fejzić is not a legitimate representative of BIH Croats. However, he is not the only one who abused the current provisions of the electoral law, which is not an integral part of the Dayton Accords in the way they are applied today. Those laws were changed by the decision of the OHR, and the new OHR is trying to correct it. The problem lies in the fact that Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not want a democratic and free Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let's use a simple example to show the difference between the social determination in Croatia and the Greater-Bosniak unitarians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At each parliamentary election, Croatia also elects eight members of national minorities living in Croatia to its composition. They are chosen in a special XII. constituency. The results of such a parliamentary election are presented on the following page: https://www.izbori.hr/site/UserDocsImages/479. The representatives from the Serbian minority in Croatia are elected with an average of about 8,000 votes, the representatives of the Italian minority with less than 900 votes and representatives from the ranks of minorities, where there are also BIH Bosniaks, are elected with slightly more than 1,700 votes. In the elections, it turned out that there were party lists that received several tens of thousands of votes in total, but due to the electoral thresholds for individual constituencies, they did not receive representatives. Let's imagine a situation where some of these parties agree to register for the next elections one of their member as a candidate on the lists for representatives of national minorities in Croatia. Considering the number of votes they have at the level of the whole of Croatia, they would certainly succeed in getting several, if not all eight of minority representatives. This kind of abuse and manipulation of the electoral process would be fully condemned by the Croatian public and would not be accepted because it would represent a violation of the rights that the constitution and the law give to others. The difference is precisely in this relationship: cheating and abuse of electoral legislation, where the majority constituent people abuse the subsequently defined electoral law to the detriment of other constituent peoples, is accepted and interpreted as a necessity by the majority people. This directly undermines the constitution, the constitutional order and the future of BIH as a society and a state. Because of such malicious activities, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a dysfunctional state and will remain so as long as there are aspirations for its radicalization and majorization of one people in relation to others.

It should be clearly emphasized that Croats in BIH are not a minority but a constituent people, equal in all rights to BIH Serbs and BIH Bosniaks. Another issue is that the Greater-Bosniak unitarians want to reduce BIH Croats, as well as BIH Serbs, to the status of a national minority. And this is one of the key issues on which no consensus can be reached because the Greater- Bosniak unitarians do not uphold their commitment to the signed international documents, but prefer instead to pursue a policy of deepening divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12. “The announced decision of the OHR on changes to the electoral law deepens the ethnic divisions in the country and increases discrimination through the further strengthening of the institute of constituent nations and the so-called legitimate representation, regardless of its other aspects, such as removing blockages in the implementation of election results.”

This decision prevents the further imposition of national divisions and the denial of the rights of other constituent and equal peoples in BIH and reduces the level of proven abuse of the electoral democratic processes, which is reduced to Greater-Bosniak unitarism under the slogan of struggle for a civil state. It boils down to the unitarism that aspired to the creation of Greater Serbia and the unitarism that started the process of the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. As history has proven, this brand of unitarianism is harmful and fatal for its holders and promoters.

Legitimacy as a concept is not a so-called concept. It is or it is not. With regard to the judgement of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Ljubić case (U 23/14), legitimacy is a legitimate concept that derives from the constitutionality stated in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Greater-Bosniak unitarians have already shown many times a tendency to rearrange election data and transfer voters to different electoral units in order to achieve the maximum through electoral engineering, which means that they have abused democracy in its full scope. This has already been seen in various elections in BIH and in the last elections for the City of Mostar.

13. “What would happen, for example, in Germany if the election rules were changed two months before the elections for the German Bundestag?”

Here again, a wrong question is being deliberately repeated, illustrating another method of disinformation by replacing theses. Namely, the question is not about changing the electoral rules in Germany two months before the elections. The real question is whether Germany would allow the final decisions of the courts in connection with established electoral irregularities, or subsequently introduced electoral provisions, not to be implemented? Would Germany allow individual parties to deliberately obstruct the process of democratization of society and the state and deliberately ignore court decisions? The answer is simple: as in the case of any democratic state and society, such activity would not be allowed. Any such schemes would be interpreted the way they can and must be interpreted - as anti-democratic and hegemonic illegal actions under the slogan of creating a civil state.

CONCLUSION 

The analysis published by IFIMES, as well as most of their previous analyses, contains a whole series of misinformation and logical and factual errors, which leads us to ask what are the real intentions of the authors and institution behind such articles. The text is neither objective, nor realistic, basically inaccurate, representing an unreliable source of data, and at the same time it is very confusing. Organizations that claim to be scientific and carrying out research sometimes forget the truth stated in the proverb historia est magistra vitae. The authors of this pamphlet, the so-called analysts, learned nothing from the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Serbian aggression on Slovenia, Croatia, BiH and later on Kosovo and Montenegro. The positions they advocate, the way they justify them, the narrative they insist upon, and finally the threats they pose remind us of everything we have already seen in the former Yugoslavia from the 80s onwards - from writing memorandums of SANU, insisting on the one man-one policy voice, denying the existence (and thus, the rights) of others and those who are different, the threats of conflicts and wars. This is the rhetoric that led to the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. This is contrary to the rhetoric used in the former Czechoslovak Republic. It is the rhetoric of intolerant, exclusive, undemocratic, unscientific, tendentious, totalitarian structures, organizations and persons.

Just as intelligent and consistent scientists adhering to scientific principles proved that our solar system is not geocentric but heliocentric, so the Greater-Bosniak unitarians must ultimately understand that the interests of BIH and all its inhabitants (members of the three nations and minorities) must be placed at the centre of the integrative processes in BIH, and not only BIH Bosniaks. They must understand that three equal constitutive nations live and work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with the minorities of which there are only a little more than 3%, together they should build the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina for members of all nations and minorities.

The civil society advocated by the Greater-Bosniak unitarians is not the civil society as is presumed and understood in Europe (which was created on the basis of nation states). Their view of civil society is anything but civil. It is ethnocentric, representing a combination of Greater-Bosniak nationalism, socialist statism, Yugoslav unitarism and (pan) Islamism¹², neglecting and ignoring the existence of others and different ones. Exactly the kind of society that the Great Serbs wanted to get through the transformation of Yugoslavia into Greater Serbia. It is with such a policy that the Greater-Bosniaks, who oppose the democratization of society, show that they do not understand and do not want to accept the entire system of principles, values and beliefs on which the EU is based, where diversity is a property and characteristic that unites, not separates, where the future is built together, where challenges are solved through conversation and open communication and not through threats, violence, conflicts, murders and wars. Those people who call for violence in their statements should understand that in Europe it has been understood and accepted that people who use such a narrative in public appearances are not considered reliable or safe partners. And such persons are sanctioned.

Their mutual constitutional and institutional equality and legitimacy necessarily follows from the constitution of the three peoples, because without legitimacy there is no democracy. And there is no cooperation on positive grounds either. The basic purpose of the electoral law is to ensure the legitimacy (constitutionality) and legality (lawfulness) of the elected political representatives, which the Greater-Bosniak hegemonic elements obviously do not want.

Without agreement of the three constituent nations in BIH there is no better future for BIH. Any other imposition, especially violent imposition of a one-sided truth leads to serious conflicts. That is why we repeat: in the EU, talking and agreeing on challenges is considered necessary and the only way to resolve challenges. Without threats, coercion, intolerance and blackmail. At least those who live and work in the EU, using the benefits of its civility and order, but who still love to write pamphlets like these, have obviously not yet accepted the European value system and should be aware of it.

Back in 2016, in one of the articles published in the National Security and the Future magazine on the topic of BIH, the reasons preventing the democratization of BIH were written in the conclusion. I quote them in full:¹³

“The hypothesis of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an unfinished state and a divided society, without indications that a basic consensus of the representatives of the three nations on common values as the legitimate basis of the democratic political order could soon be reached, cannot be refuted by pointing to the ethno-nationalist policies of the most important political parties, and the prevalence of such a situation to call for respect for the principles of citizenship, which is a key Bosniak argument in opposition to negotiations on the constitutional reform. Also, it is impossible to reach an acceptable solution even with the Serbian firm defence of entity parastatism. The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina are proving to be the biggest post-Dayton losers, because in the entity parliament they can hardly influence political decisions and they only have the principle of veto on decisions of vital national interest. In such an unequal position, the interpretation of the vital national interest usually takes place under conditions of constant tension. National and confessional divisions in BiH are historically rooted and should not be given a normativity character, but rather be accepted as a fact and only in mutual dialogue  one can see whether it is decisive when it comes to the impossibility of establishing a political community as a key condition for the functioning of the political system. 

So, it is quite clear that there are currently three separate political communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as three different visions of the development of democracy, which cannot be successfully developed without a state system that will be acceptable to all constituent peoples. Furthermore, taking into account the potential danger of further disintegration, there are no scientific arguments that the concept of federalization would distance the multi-ethnic BiH from the establishment of a political community, but mostly in the public space, war is being used with entrenched metaphors and misinformation. Moreover, we are of the opinion that if there is a possibility of constitution of a legitimate political community, then federalization with strengthening of state institutions is the only way towards integration. Group identities cannot be suppressed or erased by civil individualistic determinations, which contemporary liberal theorists also agree on today. Questions of historical heritage and their interpretations are extremely important for one ethnic group, and the key question is whether in the near future all constituent peoples of BiH can reach an agreement on common values necessary for the establishment of a political community. Democracy is definitely not a questionable value, but it is certainly insufficient and it played its important symbolic role in the 90s when the autocratic one-party regime was collapsing. We do not believe that a consensus around the principle of ZAVNOBIH as an integration value is possible, just as there is no new unifying political myth on the horizon“.¹⁴ 

The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in a fully realized consociational democracy. No less and no more than that. We hope that there is still time for a democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina, a legal and prosperous state for all three peoples and minorities living in it. And that there is hope.

An additional question that arises (after this one, as well as a series of other disinformation tests and analytical articles) is whether such interest organizations deserve to be part of international organizations whose goal is construction and not demolition, truth and not untruth, accuracy and completeness, and not inaccuracy and partiality. Such pamphlets show and prove the correctness of our intention to establish the HWRI/IIHS as a non-governmental, non-partisan, non-profit association of citizens dedicated to fighting misinformation which is trying to flood the Croatian and international public space.

Zagreb, 26 July 2022

Assist. Prof. Gordan Akrap, PhD
Hybrid Warfare Research Institute 

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1  such as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights

2  Gordan Akrap: Information strategies and operations in shaping public knowledge, University of Zagreb, doctoral dissertation, 2011, p. 86

3  Miroslav Tuđman: Programming the truth - discussion on the redistribution of social stocks of knowledge, HSN, Zagreb, 2012

4  In accordance with the accepted proposal of his colleague Prof. Dr Ivica Lučić, in this paper we will use the names BIH Bosniaks, BIH Croats and BIH Serbs for the members of the three constitutive nations in BIH in order to fully and unequivocally determine their belonging to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

5  slobodnaevropa.org: Gabriel Escobar za RSE: Rata u BiH neće biti, Dodik štiti svoju moć i bogatstvo, ba.n1info.com: Gabriel Escobar stigao u Sarajevo, sastao se sa predstavnicima Trojke 

6  More in the book: „The Road to Dayton – U.S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process, May-December 1995“

7  maxportal.hr: Banjalučki RTRS razotkrio aferu čiji je cilj bio osramotiti hrvatsku predsjednicu

8  Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

9  https://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf

10  Bosnia: Tihić and SDA, struggle for power; 17.1.2008, letter from the US Embassy available in the Public Library of Diplomacy, ID: 08Sarajevo100_a: "Tihić's medical and political problems raise concerns about the direction of the post-Tihić SDA. If Tihić resigns or is forced out, the SDA led by Izetbegović would almost certainly take a more nationalist stance that Haris Silajdžić and his Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina will compete with, and would probably result in a more radicalized Bosniak electorate."

11  balkans.aljazeera.net: Turska je ‘protjerivanje’ iz programa F-35 pretvorila u blagoslov

12  Where individuals and groups should be added who are without a clear identity determination but with clear personal interests.

13  nsf-journal.hr: Bosna i Hercegovina – Nedovršena država, podijeljeno društvo, i nemogućnost konstituiranja političke zajednice (Svezak 17, br. 3, 2016.)

14  Vedran Matošić: Bosna i Hercegovina – Nedovršena država, podijeljeno društvo, i nemogućnost konstituiranja političke zajednice, National Security and the Future, Vol 17, No 3, 2016, str. 7-30, nsf-journal.hr (Svezak 17, br. 3, 2016.)